The Palestine Papers 6: Future Palestinian State stripped bare and totally demilitarised

Livni to Palestinian negotiators: "You choose not to have the right of choice afterwards"

In a striking exchange from May 2008, Tzipi Livni, the then-Israeli foreign minister, tells Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat that he will have to accept an Israeli military presence in the West Bank. His objection is met with one of Livni’s more memorable dismissals:

Erekat: Do I have a choice of who to place on my territory?

Livni: No.

Erekat: I have a conceptual framework – short of your jet fighters in my sky and your army on my territory, can I choose where I secure external defence?

Livni: No. In order to create your state you have to agree in advance with Israel – you choose not to have the right of choice afterwards. These are the basic pillars.

So, in addition to pushing for a long-term presence in Palestine, Israeli negotiators also sought to rule out specific roles for the Palestinian security forces. On May 11, 2008, Ahmed Qurei, the former Palestinian prime minister, asks if the Palestinian state will have control over its airspace. Livni tells him that it will have to share control with Israel, and that “sometimes we will need to act in your airspace”.

Qurei: I want sovereignty over my airspace to be respected.

Livni: Dignity means freedom to choose – you need to put limitations according to your free will.

Israel also insists on creating “white” and “black” lists for those security forces – documents detailing which equipment and roles are approved or prohibited.

Qurei: So you want a list of what is not allowed – and all the rest is allowed?

Livni: No. We need a written formula and a list. First a “no” list, then a “yes” list. So what you don’t need (no army) and what you do need (maintaining law and order).

The Palestinian Authority largely accepts the premise of demilitarisation, though it does not endorse an Israeli presence in the West Bank. (In a February 2007 meeting with Marc Otte, the European Union envoy, Erekat suggests that NATO forces fill the third party role.)

A May 20, 2008 memo from the NSU – talking points for an upcoming security meeting with the Israelis – states bluntly that “Palestine will not require an army, assuming we agree to a third party role to take care of our defence needs”.

All of these demands, of course, are intended to ensure Israel’s security. Palestinian negotiators rarely ask about how they will secure their own state against external threats – and when Erekat did, in May 2008, he received what was perhaps an unencouraging response:

Erekat: So no army, no navy… fine. But what do I do if my security is at stake? What should I do?

Gilad: Consult.

(Jazeera)

The Palestine Papers 4: Terminating Hamas, PA's obsession

Livni to PA: “Our strategic view is to strengthen you and weaken Hamas.”

Erekat to US: "We control zakat and mosques"

For Fatah, the Annapolis process seems to have been as much about crushing Hamas as about ending Israel's occupation. Instead of focusing on resolving the core issues at hand, why did Palestinian negotiators spend so much time during the meetings denigrating their political rivals, Hamas? Fatah security forces routinely arrest members of Hamas in the West Bank.

The Palestine Papers reveal that Fatah was obsessed with maintaining political supremacy over Hamas, with Israel’s cooperation, especially following the 2006 electoral victory of the Islamist movement. The Palestinian Authority extensively cracked down on Hamas institutions to weaken the group and strengthen its own relationship with Israel.

At the height of negotiations, on April 7, 2008, Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni was unequivocal in summing up Israel’s policy: “Our strategic view is to strengthen you and weaken Hamas.”

Working with Israel to weaken Hamas also appeared to be in the Palestinian Authority’s interest. During a May 6, 2008 security meeting between Yoav Mordechai, the head of the Israeli army civil administration in the West Bank, and Hazem Atallah, the head of the Palestinian Civil Police, Hamas was a prominent subject of discussion.

Yoav Mordechai: How is your fight against “civilian” Hamas: the officers, people in municipalities, etc. This is a serious threat.

Hazem Atallah: I don’t work at the political level, but I agree we need to deal with this.

Yoav Mordechai: Hamas needs to be declared illegal by your President. So far it is only the militants that are illegal.

Atallah: There is also the request for tear gas canisters. You previously gave us these back in 96.”

Yoav Mordechai: We gave some to you for Balata 2 weeks ago. What do you need them for?

Atallah: Riot control. We want to avoid a situation where the security agencies may be forced to fire on unarmed civilians.

PLO chief negotiator Saeb Erekat made his contempt for his rivals known in 2007, when he told the Belgian foreign minister Karel de Gucht, “I can’t stand Hamas or their social programs.”

By September 17, 2009, Erekat was bragging to U.S. officials that the PA had complete control over “zakat” committees, or Muslim charities, in the West Bank, as well as the weekly Friday sermons. Palestinian officials were often more concerned with applying pressure to Hamas than easing a humanitarian crisis. PA began controlling the mosques.

“We have invested time and effort and even killed our own people to maintain order and the rule of law,” Erekat said. “The Prime Minister is doing everything possible to build the institutions. We are not a country yet but we are the only ones in the Arab world who control the Zakat and the sermons in the mosques. We are getting our act together.”

In 2007, Fatah was “increasing pressure on ‘zakat’ charity committees that support the network of Islamic schools and health clinics which helped fuel Hamas's rise to power.” On one occasion, Reuters reported, 20 gunmen stormed a dairy funded by such a zakat committee.

On February 11, 2008, Atallah presented the Israelis with a laundry list of actions the PA took against Hamas. “We made arrests, confiscated arms, and sacked security individuals affiliated with Hamas,” Atallah said, “but you keep on deterring our efforts, and this is what’s happening in Nablus.”

While security cooperation against Hamas and its institutions dominated some meetings, often Palestinian negotiators merely wanted to vent to their Israeli counterparts about their deep-seated desire to defeat their political opponents.

“Hamas must not feel that it is achieving daily victories, sometimes with Israel and sometimes with Egypt, and Al Jazeera Channel praises these victories,” Ahmed Qurei, a senior Palestinian negotiator, told Livni on February 4, 2008.

“I hope Hamas will be defeated.”

According to the Palestine Papers, for Fatah, the Annapolis process seems to have been as much about crushing Hamas as it was about ending Israel’s occupation and establishing an independent, Palestinian state.

“We continue with a genuine process,” Saeb Erekat confided to European Union Special Representative Marc Otte on June 18, 2008, “reaching an agreement is a matter of survival for us. It’s the way to defeat Hamas.”.

excerpts from Al Jazeera